We introduce algorithms that obtain a small regret against non-myopic bidders either when the market is large, i.e., no single bidder appears in more than a small constant fraction of the rounds, or when the bidders are impatient, i.e., they discount future utility by some factor mildly bounded away from one.

We introduce algorithms that obtain a small regret against non-myopic bidders either when the market is large, i.e., no single bidder appears in more than a small constant fraction of the rounds, or when the bidders are impatient, i.e., they discount future utility by some factor mildly bounded away from one.

In cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-impression (CPM) advertising campaigns, advertisers always run the risk of spending the budget without getting enough conversions. Moreover, the bidding on advertising inventory has few connections with propensity one that can reach to target cost-per-acquisition (tCPA) goals. To address this problem, this paper presents a bid optimization scenario to achieve the desired tCPA goals for advertisers. In particular, we build the optimization engine to make a decision by solving the rigorously formalized constrained optimization problem, which leverages the bid landscape model learned from rich historical auction data using non-parametric learning. The proposed model can naturally recommend the bid that meets the advertisers' expectations by making inference over advertisers' historical auction behaviors, which essentially deals with the data challenges commonly faced by bid landscape modeling: incomplete logs in auctions, and uncertainty due to the variation and fluctuations in advertising bidding behaviors. The bid optimization model outperforms the baseline methods on real-world campaigns, and has been applied into a wide range of scenarios for performance improvement and revenue liftup.

A rare, sealed copy of Nintendo's original'The Legend of Zelda' video game is up for auction and will sell for more than a princely sum when the auction ends later this month. Dallas-based Heritage Auctions is auctioning off the never-before-opened game, which has a current bid of $115,000. It is one of many sought-after vintage games on offer in Heritage's first video games auction, which runs until July 10. The copy of Zelda has a grade of 9.0 from Wata Games, a game grading company and is placed inside a plastic container. This particular version is a No Rev-A Round SOQ model, which was produced in late 1987, before being replaced by the Rev-A variant in 1988.

We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms, e.g., empirical pricing, do not provide nontrivial regret rounds in this setting in general. We introduce algorithms that obtain a small regret against non-myopic bidders either when the market is large, i.e., no single bidder appears in more than a small constant fraction of the rounds, or when the bidders are impatient, i.e., they discount future utility by some factor mildly bounded away from one. Our approach carefully controls what information is revealed to each bidder, and builds on techniques from differentially private online learning as well as the recent line of works on jointly differentially private algorithms.

We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms, e.g., empirical pricing, do not provide nontrivial regret rounds in this setting in general. We introduce algorithms that obtain a small regret against non-myopic bidders either when the market is large, i.e., no single bidder appears in more than a small constant fraction of the rounds, or when the bidders are impatient, i.e., they discount future utility by some factor mildly bounded away from one. Our approach carefully controls what information is revealed to each bidder, and builds on techniques from differentially private online learning as well as the recent line of works on jointly differentially private algorithms.